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Philosophical orthodoxy holds that Thomas Reid is an externalist con-
cerning epistemic justification, characterizing Reid as holding the key to
an externalist response to internalism. These externalist accounts of Reid,
however, have neglected his work on prejudice, a heretofore unexamined
aspect of his epistemology. Reid’s work on prejudice reveals that he is
far from an externalist. Despite the views Reid may have inspired, he ex-
emplifies internalism in opting for an accessibility account of justification.
For Reid, there are two normative statuses that a belief might satisfy,
being blameless and having a just ground. Through reflection, a ratio-
nal agent is capable of satisfying both of these statuses, making Reid an
accessibility internalist about epistemic justification.1
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Introduction
Thomas Reid has long been characterized as an early protagonist for externalism1
in epistemology. Some authors think that Reid provides an externalist response2
to the skeptic:3
James Van Cleve –4
“If Reid’s externalist epistemology is correct, we can at any rate know5
many of the things the skeptic says we cannot know – we can know things6
our knowing of which implies that the skeptic is wrong.”27
Others take it that Reid’s view is close to reliabilism:8
William Alston –9
“I don’t want to suggest that Reid puts forward a reliability account of10
the nature of knowledge, for he proffers no such account at all. However11
the fact that his epistemological first principles have to do exclusively12
with reliability strongly suggests that this is the sort of account he would13
give if he should turn his attention to the question.”314
And yet others that Reid is a proper functionalist:15
Alvin Plantinga –16
“Reliabilism marks a real advance − or better, it represents a fortunate re-17
treat, a happy return to the externalist perspective occupied much earlier18
by Thomas Reid . . . the [proper functionalism] I shall develop is broadly19
Reidian; the global outline of Thomas Reid’s epistemology seems to me20
to be largely correct.”421
22
Michael Bergmann −23
“What distinguishes Reidian externalism from other versions of epistemic24
externalism about justification is it proper functionalism and its common-25
sensism, both of which are inspired by the eighteenth-century Scottish26
philosopher Thomas Reid.”527
Despite the views Thomas Reid may have inspired, he is not an externalist about28
epistemic justification.6 Reid holds an accessibility internalist view of justifi-29
cation, one quite at odds with the externalist views that now claim his influence.30
31
2See Van Cleve (2008), p. 305. For similar views, see de Bary (2002) and Greco (2004).
3See Alston (1985), p. 437. For another view on which Reid is a reliabilist, see de Bary
(2002) and Greco (2002) and (2004).
4See Plantinga (1993b), pp. viii-x.
5See Bergmann (2008), p. 52. For another proper functionalist interpretation of Reid, see
Poore (2015).
6‘Epistemic justification’ is the concept picked out by correct natural language uses of “S
is justified in believing that p.”
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We will proceed as follows. In Section 1, I characterize access internalism,32
providing further detail on the variety of internalism to which Reid ascribes.33
In Sections 2 and 3, I then identify two normative statuses in Reid that beliefs34
might satisfy, being blameless and having a just ground, demonstrating that both35
of these are best described as accessibility accounts of justification. I then con-36
clude in Section 4 by discussing the advantages of this interpretation — it makes37
clear how to identify justification in Reid, improves on past internalist interpre-38
tations of Reid, and reveals the errors of previous externalist understandings39
of Reid. For Reid, all of the normative statuses that beliefs might satisfy are40
internally accessible, making Reid an internalist about epistemic justification.41
1 Preliminaries42
1.1 Identifying Justification in Reid43
There are a number of challenges to locating a view of epistemic justification in44
Reid. To begin with, Reid never provides a sustained discussion of the concept45
of epistemic justification. In all of his works, he uses ‘justified’ only four times46
and ‘justification’ merely once [23, 77, 89, 358, 398].7 Only three of these47
occurrences obviously enlist the epistemic sense of justification, and all of these48
focus on particular cases of justified belief. Here is one such instance:49
“A child who has once burnt his finger, by putting it in the flame of one50
candle, expects the same event if he puts it in the flame of another candle,51
or in any flame, and is thereby led to think that the quality of burning52
belongs to all flame. This instinctive induction is not justified by the53
rules of logic, and it sometimes leads men into harmless mistakes, which54
experience may afterwards correct; but it preserves us from destruction55
in innumerable dangers to which we are exposed” [398].56
Little can be inferred from this passage. Reid makes it clear that induction is57
not justified by logic, but does not address whether such inductive beliefs are58
ultimately justified. Reid’s other mentions of justified beliefs are equally sparse,59
providing meager resources to flesh out a theory of justification:60
“If we should grant to Mr. Hume that our ideas of memory afford no61
just ground to believe the past existence of things which we remember,62
it may still be asked how it comes to pass that perception and memory63
are accompanied with belief, while bare imagination is not. Though this64
belief cannot be justified upon his system, it ought to be accounted for65
as a phenomenon of human nature” [352].66
Here Reid discusses what can be justified on the basis of Hume’s account of67
memory, but this provides nothing that will help in adjudicating the dispute68
between internalists and externalists. In order to establish what Reid’s view of69
the contemporary debate on justification might have been, we will have to look70
7All references to Reid’s works are paginated according to Hamilton (1895).
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elsewhere.71
72
One strategy for assessing what Reid might have thought about contemporary73
discussions of justification is by starting with the theoretical roles that epistemic74
justification is meant to play and then identifying which concepts in Reid are75
capable of filling those roles. The current notion of justification is meant to76
satisfy a number of theoretical roles, including making sense of truth as the aim77
of belief, capturing when rational agents are praiseworthy and blameworthy for78
their beliefs, and providing guidance on what beliefs to hold. The challenge,79
not just in Reid, but also in the current debate, is that not all theorists agree80
about the relevance of these roles for a theory of justification. Process reliabil-81
ism prioritizes the thought that justification should be connected to truth, but82
reliabilism has fallen into disrepute, and there are others that argue that no83
sense can be made of justification being truth-conducive.8 Epistemic deontolo-84
gists take epistemic blamelessness to be coextensive with justification, but many85
epistemologists hold the two notions can come apart.9 Proponents of natural-86
ized epistemology think that the analysis of justification should offer guidance87
for epistemic improvement, while others epistemologists see this as inessential88
for theorizing about justification.1089
90
Because all of these theoretical roles are up for debate, the role that I will be91
using to pinpoint justification in Reid is even more fundamental. Both internal-92
ists and externalists about epistemic justification agree that there are normative93
statuses that believers might satisfy or fail to satisfy, and that being justified in94
one’s beliefs is one such status. These statuses can be identified via discussions95
about what rational agents epistemically ought to believe. Whatever the views96
of internalists and externalists on epistemic praise and blame or justification’s97
truth-connection, they can at least agree that there is a sense of epistemic ought98
or should that attaches to the concept of justification. My project then will be99
to focus on this theoretical role, examining whether the epistemic normative sta-100
tuses found in Reid are more amenable to an internalist or externalist treatment.101
102
To see what this methodology might look like in practice, let’s consider two103
properties that beliefs might possess, being instinctual and having a just ground.104
Based on Reid’s comments, instinctual belief does not seem to be a normative105
epistemic status. Consider, for instance, the following passage:106
“When we consider man as a rational creature, it may seem right that he107
should have no belief but what is grounded upon evidence, probable or108
8For critiques of process reliabilism, see Cohen (1984) and Conee and Feldman (1998). For
an argument that what justification has to do with truth remains obscure, see Cohen (2016).
9See Goldman (1988), Littlejohn (2015), and Williamson (2015). For cases of blamelessness
sans justification, see Alston (1989b), p. 145; Conee and Feldman (1985), p. 17; Pryor (2001),
pp. 114-115; and Christensen (2004), pp. 161-162.
10Naturalized epistemologists emphasizing the ameliorative conception of epistemological
analysis include Kitcher (1992), p. 64, Kornblith (2001), p. 238, and Wrenn (2006), p. 60.
For some of the shortcomings of this perspective, see Christensen (2004), chapter 6.5.
3
Thomas Reid, the Internalist
demonstrative; and it is, I think, commonly taken for granted, that it is109
always evidence, real or apparent, that determines our belief. If this be110
so, the consequence is, that, in no case, can there be any belief, till we111
find evidence, or, at least, what to our judgment appears to be evidence.112
I suspect it is not so; but that, on the contrary, before we grow up to the113
full use of our rational faculties, we do believe, and must believe, many114
things without any evidence at all [...] We are irrational animals for a115
considerable time before we can properly be called rational [...] If there116
be any instinctive belief in man, it is probably of the same kind with that117
which we ascribe to brutes, and may be specifically different from that118
rational belief which is grounded on evidence” [548].119
Here, Reid points out that instinctive beliefs are formed before we are rational120
creatures, with many of them based on no evidence whatsoever. These beliefs are121
not ones that Reid thinks we should evaluate from the epistemic point of view,122
as they are “specifically different from that rational belief which is grounded on123
evidence.” If there is any normativity that attaches to instinctual beliefs, any124
sense of ought or should under which we must adopt such beliefs, it is purely125
a practical or prudential kind of normativity. Reid thinks that “it is necessary126
for our preservation, that we should believe many things before we can reason”127
[333], but if instinctual beliefs are adopted merely out of practical necessity, this128
is not a place to go looking for Reid’s views on epistemic justification.129
130
While the previous passage on instinctual beliefs focused on things we believe131
before we are rational creatures, it also mentions beliefs that are rationally132
formed, saying that, “when we consider man as a rational creature, it may seem133
right that he should have no belief but what is grounded upon evidence.” Here134
we find our first normative epistemic status. A property that looks like a better135
a candidate for a theory of justification in Reid is having good evidence, also136
known as having a just ground:137
“I shall take it for granted that the evidence of sense, when the proper138
circumstances concur, is good evidence, and a just ground of belief [...] All139
good evidence is commonly called reasonable evidence, and very justly,140
because it ought to govern our belief as reasonable creatures” [328].141
Here we have normative language associated with a distinctly epistemic domain142
of evaluation. Because we are reasonable creatures, we ought to govern our143
beliefs based on when we have a just ground for belief, making having a just144
ground a candidate for a theory of justification. This is of course just a preview,145
and we will discuss further what having a just ground involves in Section 3,146
but this has served as a helpful primer on identifying justification in Reid. In147
this paper, I will argue that there are two normative epistemic statuses that148
can be found in Reid, being blameless and having a just ground. If Reid is an149
externalist concerning epistemic justification, then at least one normative status150
for belief will be analyzable in a manner friendly to externalists. I will argue,151
however, that both statuses are best characterized as accessibility accounts of152
justification.153
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1.2 Access Internalism154
Even though Reid is often interpreted as an externalist about justification, he155
actually ascribes to access internalism, the clearest form of internalism. It is a156
fraught question within epistemology precisely what distinguishes an internalist157
from an externalist theory of justification, and I will not try to provide neces-158
sary and sufficient conditions to adjudicate the issue.11 Instead, I will focus on159
two points of agreement between internalists and externalists. We have already160
seen one of these points. Both internalists and externalists agree that there are161
normative statuses that believers might satisfy or fail to satisfy, and that being162
justified in one’s beliefs is one such status. These statuses can be identified163
by the presence of normatively loaded language surrounding believers and their164
mental lives, along with discussions about what rational agents should or ought165
to believe. Whatever the views of internalists and externalists on the necessary166
and sufficient conditions for justification, they thus can at least agree that there167
is a sense of epistemic ought or should that attaches to the concept of justifica-168
tion. My project then will be to focus on this feature of justification, examining169
whether the epistemic normative statuses found in Reid are more amenable to170
an internalist or externalist treatment. There are two such statuses in Reid,171
being blameless and having a just ground. If Reid is an externalist concerning172
epistemic justification, then at least one normative status for belief will be an-173
alyzable in a manner friendly to externalists.174
175
The second point of agreement between internalists and externalists that I will176
leverage is that accessibility accounts of justification are clearly internalist.177
Wherever the line is drawn between internalism and externalism, access in-178
ternalism will always fall on the internalist side of that line. Let us take a fairly179
simple account:180
Access Internalism: All of the facts that are required to justify an181
agent S in believing p are internally accessible to S182
What precisely are these facts? What does it mean for them to be accessible?183
When I reflect, I can discover many things about my mental life. I can take184
stock of my memories and current experiences, and I can ascertain the strength185
with which certain things seem to be the case. These are the sorts of facts that186
can justify my beliefs - that I remember that p, I am experiencing that p, or187
that p seems to be the case. The central thought is that these are facts that I188
can tell whether or not they obtain. Now there might be various ways in which189
I reflect on these facts about my mental life. I could have examined them in the190
past, I could currently be reflecting them, or I might never have thought twice191
about them. Which choice we make here will yield different forms of access192
internalism. I will choose the latter for now and, in Section 3.3, we will see193
11For various takes on the troubled history of the internalism/externalism distinction, see
Alston (1986), Bergmann (1997), Goldman (2009), and Kim (1993). I am inclined to follow
Feldman (2005) in thinking that providing such necessary and sufficient conditions is not
possible because what is considered internalism is a matter of stipulation (p. 349).
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reason to think that this is a fitting choice. Thus, the sense in which the facts194
that justify S in believing p must be accessible is that they must be accessible195
upon reflection. These facts need not have ever been accessed before in order196
for them to do their justifying work — the agent merely must be capable of197
reflecting on them.198
2 Reid on Epistemic Blamelessness199
The first normative status for belief in Reid is blamelessness, beliefs that,200
whether they be true or false, are blameless for a subject to believe. Many201
might be surprised to find blameless belief discussed in Reid given that there202
are several elements of Reid’s philosophy that suggest he would not countenance203
that people could be blameworthy for their beliefs. For one, Reid subscribes to204
an “ought implies can” principle. Speaking of the moral case, Reid says, “When205
we impute to a man any action or omission, as a ground of approbation or206
of blame, we must believe he had power to do otherwise” [447]. Thus, if an207
action is irresistible for a person, they cannot properly be blamed. In many208
cases though, this is exactly how Reid describes belief. Reid often characterizes209
believing the deliverances of common sense as “irresistible” [110, 226, 232, 258,210
368], and he doesn’t stop there, agreeing in a letter to James Gregory that all211
cases of believing are involuntary saying, “I cannot but agree with you that212
assent or belief is not a voluntary act. Neither is seeing when the eyes are open”213
[74].214
215
Reid then uses the involuntary nature of belief to dodge criticism by the global216
skeptic. When the skeptic presses, “Why do you believe the existence of the217
external object which you perceive?” Reid replies, “This belief, sir, is none of218
my manufacture; it came from the mint of Nature; it bears her image and super-219
scription; and, if it is not right, the fault is not mine” [183]. If Reid held that all220
believing is involuntary, and that this is incompatible with being blameworthy221
for one’s beliefs, it is difficult to see how Reid would think we are blameworthy222
for any of our beliefs, a problematic view given the possibility of unjustified223
beliefs. Reid could hold the novel view that there are no unjustified beliefs. If224
Reid holds that none of our beliefs are blameworthy, this is a reason to go look-225
ing elsewhere for a possible theory of justification, and there are strong reasons226
to think that this is the view Reid held.227
228
Nevertheless, there are passages in Reid that suggest we might be blameworthy229
for some of our beliefs. Consider the following:230
“Many things called deceptions of the senses are only conclusions rashly231
drawn from the testimony of the senses. In these cases the testimony of232
the senses is true, but we rashly draw a conclusion from it, which does233
not necessarily follow. We are disposed to impute our errors rather to234
false information than to inconclusive reasoning, and to blame our senses235
for the wrong conclusions we draw from their testimony” [335].236
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According to this passage, there are instances of belief formation for which237
we incorrectly blame our senses. These cases are those in which we form a238
belief based on our sense experience yet draw improper conclusions from this239
experience. The case that Reid gives is that of incorrectly believing that a coin240
is a guinea, a gold coin in circulation at the time. In such a case, the senses are241
not to blame:242
“Thus, when a man has taken a counterfeit guinea for a true one, he243
says his senses deceived him; but he lays the blame where it ought not244
to be laid: for we may ask him, ‘Did your senses give a false testimony245
of the colour, or of the figure, or of the impression?’ No. But this is all246
that they testified, and this they testified truly: From these premises you247
concluded that it was a true guinea, but this conclusion does not follow;248
you erred, therefore, not by relying upon the testimony of sense, but by249
judging rashly from its testimony” [335].250
The believer in this situation, according to Reid, “lays the blame where it ought251
not to be laid.” So where should the blame be laid? There are a few possibili-252
ties. Perhaps the person who made the judgment is to blame. Perhaps another253
belief-forming faculty is to blame. Or maybe all parties to the formation of the254
belief in question are blameless.255
256
The possibility we are concerned with, of course, is that the person who formed257
the belief is to blame. Let’s suppose for the moment that this is correct. If258
the person is blameworthy for forming the belief that they are observing a true259
guinea instead of a counterfeit one, on what grounds are they blameworthy?260
They are blameworthy in that they did not infer correctly from the information261
that was provided to them by the senses. Reid goes on to say, “Not only are262
your senses innocent of this error, but it is only by their information that it can263
be discovered. If you consult them properly, they will inform you that what264
you took for a guinea is base metal, or is deficient in weight, and this can only265
be known by the testimony of sense” [335]. If the person is blameworthy, it is266
because they mishandled the deliverances of the senses in forming their belief.267
But these deliverances are all accessible by reflection.12 Reid makes it clear that268
part of your experience is that the coin is made of a base metal or is deficient269
in weight, and by not attending to these features of their experience, this is270
where the believer goes wrong. If the epistemic agent is blameworthy in this271
particular case, it is because they did not form their belief on the basis of all the272
facts that were reflectively accessible to them.13 This observation is of course273
not sufficient to show that Reid is an internalist about epistemic justification.274
12It might be worried that because this is a case of acquired perception, Reid’s account of
blameworthiness might differ for cases of original perception. Reid, however, never considers
the possibility that original perceptions might be blameworthy, reinforcing the thought that an
ought implies can principle plays a role for Reid in attributions of epistemic blameworthiness.
13It of course might not be the case that the epistemic agent is blameworthy for their belief,
though if they are not, then this passage is orthogonal to our discussion. For what it is worth,
I do not think that Reid regards the subject who formed the belief as blameworthy in this
case. Along with the evidence presented earlier in Section 2, Reid does not always equate
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There are many externalists who think that blameless and justified beliefs come275
apart.14 What it does show is that there is one normative status of belief in276
Reid that will not be of help to the externalist.277
278
One strategy for pushing back against the internalist reading of blamelessness279
is to point out that Reid notes the difficulty of distinguishing between the in-280
formation provided by the senses and the beliefs produced by faulty reasoning.281
Take, for example, Reid’s comparison of perception with the axioms of mathe-282
matics. In some cases, the conclusions we draw from mathematical axioms are283
so closely related to them, that it becomes difficult to tell them apart:284
“When a long train of reasoning is necessary in demonstrating a math-285
ematical proposition, it is easily distinguished from an axiom; and they286
seem to be things of a very different nature. But there are some proposi-287
tions which lie so near to axioms, that it is difficult to say whether they288
ought to be held as axioms, or demonstrated as propositions. The same289
thing holds with regard to perception, and the conclusions drawn from290
it. Some of these conclusions follow our perceptions so easily, and are291
so immediately connected with them, that it is difficult to fix the limit292
which divides the one from the other” [185].293
Here, Reid points out that it is not always straightforward to distinguish what294
is given to us in perception from what is then a conclusion from our reasoning.295
We move quickly and naturally from the data of perception to conclusions about296
the world around us, making it less than clear where our senses end and our297
thinking begins.15298
299
Does Reid’s admission that it is difficult to separate between the deliverances of300
perception and reasoning threaten our internalist understanding of blameless-301
ness? The first thing to note in response to this issue is that Reid says that it302
is difficult, not impossible, to draw a line between the products of perception303
and those of reasoning. The previous passage leaves open the possibility that,304
despite the challenge, Reid still thinks we can distinguish between the two. A305
further reason to think that it is possible to make the distinction between per-306
ception and reasoning are the types of examples Reid uses to demonstrate his307
point. Reid appeals to the five following examples in order to illustrate the308
difficulty of distinguishing between what is the result of perception versus what309
is the result of reasoning:310
• “When I see a garden in good order, containing a great variety of things311
of the best kinds, and in the most flourishing condition, I immediately312
misplaced blame on the senses with blaming the subject who formed the belief. In delineating
more examples of when the senses are not to blame, Reid points out that some of the mistaken
beliefs we form are simply due to a normally functioning constitution, a paradigm case of a
belief that is not blameworthy for an individual to accept. [337]
14See Goldman (1988), Littlejohn (2015), and Williamson (2015).
15Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to address whether this admis-
sion of Reid’s undermines an internalist interpretation of blamelessnes.
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conclude from these signs, the skill and industry of the gardener” [186].313
• “A farmer, when he rises in the morning, and perceives that the neigh-314
bouring brook overflows his field, concludes that a great deal of rain hath315
fallen in the night” [186].316
• “Perceiving his fence broken, and his corn trodden down, [the farmer]317
concludes that some of his own or his neighbours cattle have broke loose”318
[186].319
• “Perceiving that his stabledoor is broke open, and some of his horses gone,320
[the farmer] concludes that a thief has carried them off” [186].321
• “[The farmer] traces the prints of his horses feet in the soft ground, and322
by them discovers which road the thief hath taken” [186].323
Reid offers these cases as ones where reasoning follows very naturally from324
perception. A well-kept garden seamlessly leads to an inference about a skilled325
gardener, and flooded fields to the conclusion that there was a heavy rain. Even326
though reasoning and perception are closely linked, however, these do not appear327
to be cases where it is impossible to separate between what is perceived and what328
is merely inferred. Reflection can reveal that the gardener and the rainfall were329
not directly perceived, but were rather inferred, from the information provided330
by the senses. Thus, although Reid does think that perception often leads331
somewhat automatically to further inferences, he does not indicate that it is332
impossible to distinguish between the two.333
3 Reid on Just Grounds for Belief334
3.1 Evidence and the Distorting Influence of Prejudice335
For Reid, it is desirable not only that our beliefs be blameless, but that they also336
have a just ground. The following passage identifies another normative status337
beliefs might satisfy:338
“I shall take it for granted that the evidence of sense, when the proper339
circumstances concur, is good evidence, and a just ground of belief [...] All340
good evidence is commonly called reasonable evidence, and very justly,341
because it ought to govern our belief as reasonable creatures” [328].342
Here we get a window into how Reid thinks that the evidence we have should343
regulate our beliefs. Good evidence provides one with just grounds that “ought344
to govern our belief.” This good evidence, however, can only provide one with345
a just ground when the proper circumstances occur. What are these proper346
circumstances? There are a couple of possibilities. On the one hand, it could347
be that the appropriate circumstances that Reid is indicating are the previ-348
ously mentioned misinterpretations of sense experience. The appropriate cir-349
cumstances would then be when we do not infer propositions beyond what our350
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experiences support. If this is the case though, then having a just ground will be351
no help to the externalist, for having a just ground will come to the same thing352
as believing blamelessly. On the other hand, and this is the interpretation that353
I favor, Reid might have in mind his other thoughts on evidence, discussions to354
which we now turn.355
356
We are all capable of incorrectly judging the strength of various pieces of ev-357
idence. How, then, can we know what the actual strength of the evidence is?358
Reid’s answer is that the strength of the evidence can be identified with how359
strong the evidence would seem to particularly clear-thinking individuals. Reid360
uses this criterion to determine both the strength of evidence:361
“I think, in most cases, we measure the degrees of evidence by the effect362
they have upon a sound understanding when comprehended clearly and363
without prejudice” [482].364
And when something is self-evident:365
“Self-evident propositions are those which appear evident to every man366
of sound understanding who apprehends the meaning of them distinctly,367
and attends to them without prejudice” [282].368
We can see how strong evidence is by how it affects someone who is free from369
prejudice.16 These are the “proper circumstances” Reid has in mind when he370
discusses having a just ground for one’s belief. Immediately before saying that371
the evidence of sense could constitute a just ground for belief, Reid makes372
reference again to the absence of prejudice:373
“What [...] evidence is, is more easily felt than described [...] every man374
of understanding can judge of it, and commonly judges right, when the375
evidence is fairly laid before him, and his mind is free from prejudice”376
[328].377
What makes the evidence of sense a just ground for belief is exactly what allows378
one to accurately assess the strength of evidence – a sound understanding and379
freedom from prejudice. This directive goes beyond Reid’s discussion of blame-380
lessness in regulating one’s beliefs and claims something further, that there is a381
certain kind of evidence that ought to regulate our beliefs.382
383
One worry at this point might be that evidence in Reid is not a normative384
notion at all, calling into question whether having a just ground is actually a385
candidate for an account of justification in Reid. William Alston, for example,386
has pointed out that there are places in Reid where evidence seems to be a387
merely psychological notion. Consider, for example, the following description of388
what unites the different kinds of evidence:389
16I am not here arguing that Reid makes a claim about what grounds the extent to which
evidence supports particular propositions, though perhaps such a claim could be made. It
will suffice that Reid thinks that this is how one would identify the extent to which evidence
supports a particular proposition.
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“I confess that, although I have, as I think, a distinct notion of the dif-390
ferent kinds of evidence above mentioned [...] yet I am not able to find391
any common nature to which they may all be reduced. They seem to me392
to agree only in this, that they are all fitted by nature to produce belief393
in the human mind” [328].394
As Alston points out, what unites different kinds of evidence in this passage is395
just “that we are so constituted that they produce beliefs in us.”17 If this is396
right, then we can identify evidence just by its effect of prompting us to believe,397
providing a purely psychological characterization of evidence.398
399
Although there are passages of Reid where evidence appears to pick out a psy-400
chological notion, there is also ample evidence that Reid also takes evidence401
to be normative. In numerous places, Reid evaluates evidence as good [328,402
345, 379, 517, 541, 626] or sufficient [328, 345, 379, 517, 541, 626], and says403
that evidence “ought to govern our belief as reasonable creatures” [328]. Reid404
also characterizes believing without evidence as a “weakness which every man405
is concerned to avoid,” [328] an impossibility if evidence just is what compels406
belief.18 Perhaps the best answer, then, for whether Reid’s notion of evidence407
is psychological or normative is that it is both. Evidence often compels assent408
in us, and when that evidence is good, it also supplies a just ground. This dual409
view is eventually what Alston settles on as well, ultimately agreeing that Reid’s410
account of evidence has both psychological and evaluative components.19411
3.2 Foundationalism and Accessibility412
Given that being free from prejudice is a crucial element of having a just ground,413
an important question is whether being free from prejudice is reflectively acces-414
sible. Given what else Reid says about prejudice, this certainly seems to be the415
case. Reid gives epistemic priority to the beliefs that are produced naturally by416
our constitutions, but these original judgments can be obscured by other beliefs417
that we have acquired along the way:418
“It must therefore require great caution, and great application of mind,419
for a man that is grown up in all the prejudices of education, fashion,420
and philosophy, to unravel his notions and opinions, till he find out the421
simple and original principles of his constitution, of which no account can422
be given but the will of our Maker” [99].423
Here we see a few sources of prejudice – education, fashion, and philosophy – and424
Reid describes further the specific prejudices that come with education in the425
special sciences and philosophy [20, 282-283]. Being under the influence of such426
prejudices though is not without remedy. It takes great caution and attention,427
17See Alston (1985), p. 438.
18For more arguments supporting the thought that Reid entertains a normative view of
evidence, See Rysiew (2005), p. 110-112, and Van Cleve (2015), pp. 323-324.
19See Alston (1985), p. 438, and (1989a), pp. 41-42.
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but a man can rid himself of prejudice so that he can discern the beliefs he has428
due to his original constitution. How does one go about ridding themselves of429
prejudice? By reflecting on what beliefs are actually the beliefs produced by430
their natural faculties, and as we have seen before, these beliefs are marked by431
their irresistibility. The ability to rid oneself of prejudice is derivative of a more432
generality ability, the ability to directly apprehend what is self-evident:433
“The same degree of understanding which makes a man capable of acting434
with common prudence in the conduct of life, makes him capable of dis-435
covering what is true and what is false in matters that are self-evident,436
and which he distinctly apprehends” [522].437
Because of this ability, rational agents are capable of ridding themselves of prej-438
udice to uncover what is self-evident. This is not to say that the process is not439
a difficult one, as Reid admits that “it is not impossible that what is only a440
vulgar prejudice may be mistaken for a first principle. Nor is it impossible that441
what is really a first principle may, by the enchantment of words, have such a442
mist thrown about it, as to hide its evidence, and to make a man of candor443
doubt it” [231]. There are moments where we may mistake a mere prejudice for444
a first principle, or where a first principle may be so obscured as to incur doubt.445
Nevertheless, despite these difficulties, the kind of understanding needed to act446
with common prudence makes it possible to root out our various prejudices.447
448
All of this fits effortlessly within Reid’s foundationalism. Self-evident beliefs449
form the foundation of a subject’s justification, and then further justified beliefs450
can be derived from this foundation, shedding light on deeply held prejudices451
along the way. This is what Reid understands himself to have done concerning452
the Theory of Ideas. Reid says that at one point he “believed the whole of Berke-453
ley’s system,” something he was only freed from by “candidly and impartially454
[...] seeking for the evidence of this principle” [283]. What Reid found was that455
beliefs about the material world are irresistible, thus firmly establishing them456
as a just ground of belief:20457
“This conviction is not only irresistible, but it is immediate, that is, it458
is not by a train of reasoning and argumentation that we come to be459
convinced of the existence of what we perceive” [259].460
As Plantinga points out, Reid is a nonclassical foundationalist in that Reid re-461
gards foundational beliefs to extend to propositions about the external world.21462
It is self-evident that there is a material world, and it follows from this that the463
Theory of Ideas is false, revealing Reid’s original confidence in the Theory to be464
mere prejudice. On Reid’s account then, freeing ourselves of prejudice is indeed465
reflectively accessible. By reflecting on what beliefs we hold irresistibly, we can466
rid ourselves of prejudice and have a just ground for our beliefs.467
20For other examples in Reid of ridding oneself of prejudice, see p. 441.
21See Van Cleve (2015), p. 341, and Plantinga (1993a), p. 86, and (1993b), pp. 95-96 and
pp. 183-184.
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3.3 Irresistible Versus Involuntary468
One issue that is important to address is the difference between beliefs that are469
irresistible versus ones that are merely involuntary. We have already discussed470
that Reid thinks all beliefs are involuntary, but he takes irresistibility to be an471
even stronger notion, with a number of dissimilarities between involuntary and472
irresistible beliefs. Beliefs are involuntary in that they arise spontaneously upon473
examining evidence, but irresistible beliefs possess a stronger involuntariness474
– they are believed no matter what evidence one examines. Such beliefs are475
“principles which irresistibly govern the belief and the conduct of all mankind”476
[110, italics mine]. But what about the philosophers who have subscribed to477
the Theory of Ideas? Haven’t they managed to throw off their commensensical478
beliefs? Reid holds that, even for them, rejecting these beliefs is impossible:479
“Leaving [the Theory of Ideas], therefore, to those who have occasion for480
it, and can use it discreetly as a chamber exercise, we may still inquire481
how the rest of mankind, and even the adepts themselves, except in some482
solitary moments, have got so strong and irresistible a belief, that thought483
must have a subject, and be the act of some thinking being” [110].484
Such are irresistible beliefs, that they cannot be given up by anyone regard-485
less of their evidence. Prejudices, meanwhile, are involuntary in that they are486
beliefs, but they are not held come what may. Prejudices have been learned,487
and thus they can also be given up. The way Reid himself came to give up his488
philosophical prejudices were by realizing their conflict with self-evident first489
principles:490
“I once believed this doctrine of ideas so firmly as to embrace the whole491
of Berkeley’s system in consequence of it; till, finding other consequences492
to follow from it, which gave me more uneasiness than the want of a493
material world, it came into my mind, more than forty years ago, to put494
the question, what evidence have I for this doctrine that all the objects of495
my knowledge are ideas in my own mind? From that time to the present I496
have been candidly and impartially, as I think, seeking for the evidence of497
this principle, but can find none, excepting the authority of philosophers”498
[283].499
One does not have direct control over their beliefs, but by examining the evi-500
dence, they can find they no longer hold the prejudices they once did. For Reid,501
this occurred by examining where the consequences of the Theory of Ideas and502
self-evident propositions came into conflict with one another.22 Thus, it is com-503
patible to hold that rational agents can rid themselves of prejudice as well as504
that these prejudices are believed involuntarily.505
506
22It might be noticed that the class of propositions that Reid considers self-evident differs
somewhat from the contemporary conception. Reid holds that irresistible though contingent
beliefs like that there is an external world are also self-evident even though they are not
necessary truths. See Reid on The First Principles of Contingent Truths [441].
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Let’s do some bookkeeping. We have identified a second normative status in507
Reid which beliefs might satisfy, that of having a just ground. One’s belief that508
p has a just ground when it is based on good evidence, evidence that would be509
considered adequate by a person free from prejudice. Given that it is possible for510
a person to rid themselves of prejudice by reflection, this is an access internalist511
condition for having a just ground for one’s belief. What justifies one’s beliefs512
begins with what is self-evident, and access to self-evident propositions can be513
attained by clearing away the distorting effects of prejudice. It is important to514
note that it is not freedom from prejudice itself that justifies an agent’s beliefs515
– that task is left to the believer’s evidence. What the lack of prejudice does516
is allow a subject to see their evidence aright, making whether their evidence517
supports a particular proposition accessible by reflection.518
519
Reid’s description of how one becomes free of prejudice places some limitations520
on which version of access internalism he can endorse. Clearly for Reid, being521
free of prejudice does not imply that one has actively gone through their stock522
of evidence and examined all of their prejudices. After all, “a man who never523
speculated about evidence in the abstract may have a good judgment” [328].524
Furthermore, having a general ability to rid oneself of prejudice does not ensure525
that this ability can be exercised at any moment whatsoever. For there may526
be times where the strength of our prejudice blinds us to our own biases - such527
is the pernicious nature of prejuice: “But as light may be so offensive that the528
bodily eye is shut involuntarily, may not something similar happen to the eye529
of the understanding, when brought to a light too offensive to some favourite530
prejudice or passion, to be endured?” [74]. So if we are going to pursue an531
accessibility account of what provides a belief with just grounds, it will have to532
be an account where the relevant facts are just reflectively accessible in principle.533
This accords with our precisification of access internalism in Section 1. For Reid,534
having a just ground is accessible in precisely the access internalist sense. Our535
beliefs have a just ground when they appear evident to us when we are free536
from prejudice, and eliminating prejudice is within a rational agent’s reflective537
power.538
3.4 Having a Sound Understanding539
One concern about this internalist interpretation of having a just ground might540
be that having a just ground not only requires that someone evaluate evidence541
without prejudice but also that they have a sound understanding: “In most542
cases, we measure the degrees of evidence by the effect they have upon a sound543
understanding when comprehended clearly and without prejudice” [482, italics544
mine]. If having a sound understanding is a necessary condition for having a just545
ground for belief, but it is not possible to tell by reflection when one has a sound546
understanding, then perhaps Reid is best interpreted as an externalist after547
all. In order to evaluate this objection, let’s first get a better handle on what548
Reid might have in mind as a “sound understanding.” To begin with, a sound549
understanding is also a freedom from certain mental defects. The first examples550
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that come to the minds of contemporary readers might be cases of mental illness,551
but Reid brings more commonplace concerns to the fore. Amongst the disorders552
of the understanding, Reid lists inordinate trust in authority [489], excessive553
analogical reasoning [470], and emotional irrationality [473]. These defects are554
correctable in that one can be made aware of the disorder as well as its remedy:555
“When we know a disorder of the body, we are often at a loss to find556
the proper remedy; but in most cases the disorders of the understanding557
point out their remedies so plainly that he who knows the one must know558
the other” [488].559
Thus, just like prejudice, not only can one be made aware of their disorders,560
but they can also rid themselves from them. Reid even goes so far as to identify561
these disorders as prejudices, calling them “biases of the understanding,” [469]562
and “prejudices which have their origin from [...] the constitution of human na-563
ture [...] [and also] which arise from the particular way in which a man has been564
trained.” [473] So a sound understanding is in part being devoid of intellectual565
defects.566
567
It might be worried that, if Reid thinks that a sound understanding is simply568
being devoid of prejudice, then his evidence formulas can only be interpreted569
as redundant, making mention of freedom from prejudice twice over. This is570
an interpretation that we should only favor if there is no other way to con-571
strue Reid’s uses of “sound understanding.” Fortunately, other explications are572
available. There are a couple things to point out here. On the one hand, Reid573
associates having a sound understanding with not having any intellectual de-574
fects. Being free from defects of this sort, and having properly functioning575
cognitive capacities, is not always reducible to forms of prejudice. Take, for576
example, Derek Brookes interpretation of sound understanding in Reid. On577
Brookes view, “by the condition of ‘sound understanding,’ Reid means, in part,578
that the powers by which the belief is produced must be functioning in such a579
way as to bring about at least one particular end for which they were designed,580
namely, the production of true beliefs.”23 If this is right, then having a sound581
understanding would go beyond the mere absence of prejudice, requiring that a582
subject has properly functioning belief-forming mechanisms.583
584
Another thing worth noting is that Reid often discusses having a sound under-585
standing in connection with the maturity of the intellect. Reid speaks often of586
the “ripeness of the understanding” [240, 362, 397, 419] even going so far as to587
treat the ripeness of the understanding as equivalent to a sound understanding:588
“But the power of judging self-evident propositions, which are clearly589
understood, may be compared to the power of swallowing our food. It is590
purely natural, and therefore common to the learned and the unlearned,591
to the trained and the untrained. It requires ripeness of understanding,592
and freedom from prejudice, but nothing else” [434].593
23See Brookes (1996), p. 8.
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Whereas before Reid said that a sound understanding and freedom from prej-594
udice are required to discern self-evident propositions [282], here he uses the595
ripeness of the understanding alongside the absence of prejudice. Why might596
the maturity of the intellect be important for comprehending evidence? Ac-597
cording to Reid, one can only apprehend evidence if they are capable of forming598
judgments about what is true and false, and this power only comes with a cer-599
tain degree of development: “I restrict [the power of judgment] to persons come600
to the years of understanding, because it may be a question whether infants,601
in the first period of life, have any judgment or belief at all” [414]. So having602
a sound understanding is not just being free from mental defect but having a603
maturity that allows one to judge whether a proposition is true or false, as this604
is a necessary condition of discerning evidence. Furthermore, having a sound605
understanding enables one to reflect on their beliefs:606
“The power of reflection upon the operations of their own minds, does607
not appear at all in children. Men must be come to some ripeness of608
understanding before they are capable of it” [240].609
Thus, a maturity of the intellect is important for having a just ground for two610
reasons. Firstly because making a judgment and apprehending evidence is only611
possible if one has attained the requisite intellectual development, and, secondly,612
because it enables believers to reflect on their own epistemic states.613
614
Combining these two strains in Reid, we get the result that a sound understand-615
ing refers to mature, properly functioning cognitive capacities. So is having a616
sound understanding an externalist condition on having a just ground? The617
first element of having a sound understanding, being free from mental defect,618
is clearly not, as this is just as amenable to reflective correction as are prej-619
udices. Having well-formed belief forming mechanisms, on the other hand, is620
mentally inaccessible and outside one’s reflective control. Given that having a621
sound understanding is part of what it takes for a belief to have a just ground,622
then isn’t having a just ground an externalist condition of justification after all?623
Presumably no. This is because, in the contemporary dispute between inter-624
nalism and externalism, we need to distinguish between conditions that need to625
hold in order for justification to take place and the conditions that themselves626
justify belief.627
628
On all forms of internalism, it must be the case that my brain developed nor-629
mally in order for me to have justified beliefs, indeed, for me to have any beliefs630
at all. I did not have any control over whether this mental development obtained631
or not. This fact, however, does not vitiate internalism because my brain de-632
veloping normally is not part of what justifies my belief that p. Instead, on the633
accessibilist view, it is that my belief is based on what is reflectively accessible634
that justifies it. Similarly, of course it is necessary that I develop a sound un-635
derstanding in order to have just grounds for my belief. But just because I do636
not have control over whether I develop a sound understanding does not mean637
that I don’t have access to what provides me with a just grounds for believing638
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that p. Having the requisite mental development is a precondition for me to639
be able to engage in the justificatory game at all, but this does not settle the640
issue between internalists and externalists and should not settle the debate over641
Reid’s views either.642
4 Advantages of the View643
4.1 Identifying Justification in Reid644
Commentators weave together markedly different concepts in Reid in discussing645
his theory of justification. Keith Lehrer finds talk of justification in what he646
calls Reid’s meta-principle, the first principle that our faculties are not falla-647
cious.24 According to Lehrer, our belief in this principle grants justification to648
our sensory beliefs, for then we have a reason to think that the beliefs produced649
by our faculties are true. James Van Cleve disagrees, however, arguing that this650
principle plays no special role in explaining why we are justified in holding per-651
ceptual beliefs. The supposed meta-principle occurs seventh on a list of similar652




All our faculties are reliable.25657
So will focus on Reid’s “meta-principle” get us any closer to his account of epis-658
temic justification? The jury is still out.26659
660
Another strategy takes Reid to equate justification with fulfilling one’s epistemic661
obligations. Blake McAllister explores this route, arguing that what Reid has662
in mind by justification is not violating one’s intellectual duties:663
“The position I will defend is that Reid [holds] that we are rationally per-664
mitted to believe in first principles, which, on my interpretation, amounts665
to justification [...] One is rationally permitted to believe something if666
believing it does not violate the normative standards or duties that ought667
24See Lehrer 1989, p. 162.
25See Van Cleve (2015), p. 360. In fairness to Lehrer, this is quite the simplification of
the principles Reid in fact lists. They also are not the only items on the list, nor is the last
principle the final item on the list:
I hold, as a first principle, the existence of everything of which I am conscious;
Those things did really happen which I distinctly remember;
Those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses and are what
we perceive them to be;
The natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious.
[442-447]
26Another externalist interpretation is that of de Bary (2002), as he takes Reid’s meta-
principle to apply only to the faculties of reasoning and judgment (pp. 33, 49, and 77-78).
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to regulate our cognition as intellectual agents [...] We are not in viola-668
tion of our duties if we are not blameworthy or cannot be criticized for669
believing as we do.”27670
McAllister argues that, for Reid, one is justified in believing that p if one is671
not blameworthy for so believing. But Van Cleve disagrees that this is what672
is even at issue. In his commentary on Reid, Van Cleve concedes that certain673
beliefs are blameworthy for Reid but denies that this status is to be equated674
with justification:675
“Very well; we have no obligation to stop believing as we do; we are676
permitted to keep on believing those things we cannot help believing.677
But even if this permission is of a distinctively epistemic sort [...] it seems678
to me to fall short of what epistemologists typically mean by warrant or679
justification.”28680
After acknowledging that there is a sense of epistemic obligation in Reid on681
which one could be blameless in their beliefs, Van Cleve denies that this amounts682
to Reid’s account of justification, claiming that justification comes apart from683
mere blamelessness in contemporary epistemology. This claim is not without684
merit - as we have already seend, several externalists make precisely the claim685
that justified beliefs are not coextensive with blameless beliefs.29686
687
So not only do we have disagreement about whether Reid is an internalist or688
externalist, but we have disagreement about how to even get a conceptual grip on689
epistemic justification in Reid. Is a belief justified if it is appropriately connected690
to a meta-principle? If one has satisfied their epistemic obligations?30 My691
account of Reid does not deal in such ambiguities. Justification is normative –692
believers ought to have justified beliefs and thus the normative statuses for belief693
are crucial to identifying justification in Reid. By focusing on such justificatory694
statuses, we can avoid confusion over how to identify justification in Reid.695
4.2 An Improved Internalist Interpretation696
Mine is not the first interpretation on which Reid is an internalist — Keith697
Lehrer also famously holds this position as well. Nothing that I have said is698
incompatible with Lehrer’s position, but one advantage of my view is that it699
does not grant any important role to the following disputed passage:700
“If any truth can be said to be prior to all others in the order of nature,701
this seems to have the best claim; because, in every instance of assent,702
27See McAllister (2016), p. 319. Nicholas Wolterstorff (2001) also takes it that justification
in Reid is a matter of fulfilling one’s epistemic obligations (pp. 185-214).
28See Van Cleve (2015), p. 335.
29See Note 8.
30For yet another way of locating a perspective on justification in Reid, see Juti (1993) who
finds talk of justification when Reid considers the authority we have for believing our senses
(p. 111).
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whether upon intuitive, demonstrative, or probable evidence, the truth703
of our faculties is taken for granted, and is, as it were, one of the premises704
on which our assent is grounded” [447].705
Lehrer takes this passage to indicate that Reid is not a reliabilist. This is be-706
cause Reid seems to be implying that we cannot have any evidence from the707
outputs of our faculties without also using as one of our premises that our fac-708
ulties are reliable.31 Van Cleve, on the other hand, insists that Reid should not709
have said this because it contradicts his other views. If Reid really thinks that710
a person can be justified in their perceptual beliefs without inductively arguing711
from the reliability of their faculties, then this passage is a mistake.32712
713
Fortunately, my view does not need to take sides on whether Reid should have714
said this or not. With or without it, the view that an agent’s beliefs are justi-715
fied because of something to which they have reflective access still has sufficient716
textual support. On my view, a belief’s being produced by a reliable faculty is717
neither necessary nor sufficient for its being blameless or having a just ground.718
Against the necessity of reliability, it is possible that some contingent beliefs719
produced by a faculty might be irresistible, making these beliefs blameless and720
providing them with a just ground, and yet also be false. This is of course721
possible on a local scale; Reid holds that even if our faculties are sometimes722
mistaken, this does not make them fallacious [485]. In this case, the beliefs723
produced by this faulty mechanism would have a just ground even though they724
were not formed by a perfectly reliable process.725
726
This point, however, is not decisive against a reliability requirement, for reli-727
abilists do not require that a belief-forming process be completely accurate in728
order to justify beliefs. So what about the global case? Can our beliefs still have729
a just ground even if they are formed by processes which are less reliable than730
not? Reid would answer in the affirmative. If one has a sound understanding731
and examines the evidence without prejudice, then they have a just ground for732
their belief even if God has deceived us and “there is no remedy” [30]. Against733
the sufficiency of reliability, it is also possible that a belief be produced by a734
reliable belief-forming process but the belief not have a just ground. Imagine735
a case where I have a belief that is reliably formed but the belief-formation736
process, even though reliable, is based on some prejudice. In such a case, I737
would not have a just ground for my reliably-formed belief. So even though I do738
not disagree with Lehrer, my view can yield an anti-reliabilist verdict without739
appealing to a particular reading of the passage in question.740
31See Lehrer (1989), pp. 162-163. For how such a view can be maintained in the face of the
charge of circularity and arbitrariness, see Lehrer (1990).
32See Van Cleve (2015), p. 342, and, for a similar view, see Lemos (2004). For interpreta-
tions on which Reid is not appealing here to epistemic justification but practical justification,
see Baumann (1999), Lundestad (2006), Magnus (2004), and Rysiew (2015). Of course, if
Reid is appealing to practical justification in accepting the first principles, then this particu-
lar passage is irrelevant to our discussion since we want to find a plausible interpretation of
Reid’s views on epistemic justification.
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4.3 Explaining Where Externalist Interpretations of Reid Go Wrong741
Another advantage of the interpretation I have put forward is that it can ex-742
plain where externalist interpretations of Reid go wrong. The first mistake that743
externalists make is failing to distinguish between two distinct notions of ex-744
ternalism in contemporary epistemology, externalist conditions for justification745
and externalist conditions for knowledge. Not disambiguating between the two746
has led to a fair amount of obscurity in debates over the sense in which Reid747
is an externalist. Some interpreters of Reid simply make it explicit that they748
are concerned with Reid’s understanding of knowledge instead of justification,749
commonly when discussing Reid’s reply to the skeptic:750
John Greco –751
“According to Reid, . . . knowledge arises from the proper functioning of752
our natural, nonfallacious (i.e. reliable) cognitive faculties.”33753
754
James Van Cleve –755
“If Reid’s externalist epistemology is correct, we can at any rate know756
many of the things the skeptic says we cannot know – we can know things757
our knowing of which implies that the skeptic is wrong.”34758
Greco and Van Cleve here link Reid’s externalism to what we can know. This,759
however, does not settle the question about whether Reid is best interpreted760
as an internalist or externalist about justification. A number of justification761
internalists have buoyed their accounts of knowledge against Gettier problems762
by incorporating externalist conditions into their analyses of knowledge.35 Reid763
may endorse an external condition on knowledge without thereby being a justi-764
fication externalist.765
766
To their credit, neither Greco nor Van Cleve claim that their interpretations of767
Reid settle the question of whether or not he is an externalist about justification.768
Other commentators on Reid, unfortunately, have not been as careful. Consider,769
for example, the reliabilist interpretation of Reid by William Alston. At the out-770
set, Alston purports to be focusing on a reliability account of knowledge saying,771
“I don’t want to suggest that Reid puts forward a reliability account of the na-772
ture of knowledge [...] However, the fact that his epistemological first principles773
have to do exclusively with reliability strongly suggests that this is the sort of774
account he would give.”36 Alston then proceeds, however, to focus on rational775
justification for the rest of the discussion, leaving it far from clear whether he776
thinks that Reid holds a reliability condition on justification or knowledge.777
778
33See Greco (2004), p. 150.
34See Van Cleve (2008), p. 305.
35See Chisholm (1977), ch. 6, Lehrer (1970), p. 127, and Shope (1983), ch. 2.
36See Alston (1985), p. 437. Italics are my own.
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Another, more recent example is the reliabilist interpretation of Reid by Philip779
de Bary. After presenting some passages in which Reid discusses the healthy780
functioning of our perceptual faculties, de Bary declares, “this is unalloyed ex-781
ternalism; the instinctive beliefs of healthy people of all kinds tend towards782
truth, whether or not the believer be aware of this tendency.”37 What does de783
Bary have in mind here by externalism? It is not obviously justification. On784
one hand, he says, “On pure externalism, these causes of error need only be785
operating in order for a believer not to know – they do not need to be known to786
be operating,”38 but a page later says that “this adds up to an account on which787
common sense beliefs are prima facie justified.”39 Again, it is unclear whether de788
Bary thinks that Reid is an externalist about knowledge, justification, or both.789
My understanding of Reid clarifies this ambiguity by explicitly outlining the790
notion of internalism and externalism at stake. I take no position on whether791
Reid endorses a fourth externalist condition on knowledge but instead argue792
that Reid is a specific kind of accessibility internalist about epistemic justifica-793
tion.794
795
The second mistake made by externalist interpretations of Reid is to take some796
element of his view in isolation and then argue that it implies that Reid is an797
externalist. Plantinga proffers the following perspective on Reid:798
“According to Reid, ‘we measure the degree of evidence by the effect it799
has on a sound understanding’ [...] what he means, I think, is that what800
counts here is (at least in part) the effect of believing B with respect to be-801
lieving A for someone who suffers from no cognitive defect, or deficiency,802
or dysfunction; someone whose (relevant) noetic faculties are functioning803
properly.”40804
Plantinga takes it that, because evidence can only correctly be seen by one with805
a sound understanding, that Reid is a proto-proper functionalist. As we have806
seen though, having a sound understanding is what allows one to reflectively807
form beliefs, and this ability is crucial because of its role in enabling detection808
of prejudice. Plantinga doesn’t even consider this possibility, however, even809
omitting a crucial part of the quote. We cannot tell what the import of a par-810
ticular piece of evidence is just because we have a sound understanding; rather,811
“we measure the degrees of evidence by the effect they have upon a sound812
understanding when comprehended clearly and without prejudice” [482]. Thus,813
when it comes to giving a full interpretation of Reid’s thoughts on justification,814
Plantinga’s reading comes up short.815
816
Michael Bergmann interprets Reid as suggesting a proper functionalism due to817
Reid’s view that the perceptual beliefs we form are contingent features of our818
natures. According to Reid, it is completely contingent that our sense of touch819
37See de Bary (2002), p. 83.
38Ibid, 85. Italics are mine.
39Ibid, 86. Italics are mine.
40See Plantinga (1993b), p. 164.
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causes beliefs about the hardness of an object: “No man can give a reason why820
the sensations of smell, or taste, or sound, might not have indicated hardness”821
[121]. Bergmann argues that this view of Reid’s is a short step away from822
externalism:823
“[This example] pushes us toward a proper function analysis of justifica-824
tion. For it suggests that the fittingness of a doxastic response depends,825
in some cases at least, on the species of the cognizer who has it. What is826
it about the species of a cognizer that determines such fittingness in those827
cases? The answer that immediately suggests itself is that what makes828
a belief a fitting unlearned doxastic response to an experience has to do829
with the way the belief-producing faculties of the cognizer in question are830
supposed to function. For clearly that is something that can vary from831
species to species.”41832
Bergmann claims that Reid’s account pushes us towards proper functionalism,833
but would Reid actually endorse proper functionalism? The short answer is no.834
Reid simply observes that the way our senses provide us with evidence could835
have differed. Presumably, Reid thinks that if our perceptual faculties differed,836
they nevertheless would still provide us with evidence, but he says little to sug-837
gest that this would have to obtain at a species level. Could the way that the838
senses give rise to perceptual beliefs differ in an individual within our species839
and still provide them with evidence? Reid is silent on this issue, but given the840
rest of Reid’s views, so long as that individual had a mature understanding and841
was able to reflectively free themselves from prejudice, he would have thought842
such an individual’s senses would have provided them with a just ground for843
their perceptual beliefs regardless of how the faculties of the rest of their species844
functioned.845
846
Perhaps we should let Plantinga and Bergmann off the hook; after all, they only847
claims that their views are inspired or suggested by Reid’s.42 There are other,848
more egregious, isolated readings, though, by those who claim to be expositing849
Reid’s own views. For de Bary’s externalist interpretation of Reid, he points to850
the fact that someone who has never speculated about evidence in the abstract851
can have a just ground for their belief. This allegedly makes Reid an externalist852
because reliable faculties can then produce justified beliefs without any reflection853
on those faculties by the believer:854
“There is no requirement from Reid, then, that believers be aware of the855
link between innateness and truth, still less that they reason out any856
link for themselves. First principles produce their ‘effect without ever857
being attended to.’ Believers come to know things ‘by their constitution’858
provided only that the link in fact holds; and Reid assumes that it does859
in fact hold, in paradigmatically reliabilist fashion.”43860
41See Bergmann (2008).
42See Plantinga (1993b), pp. viii-x, and Bergmann (2008).
43See de Bary (2002), pp. 84. James Van Cleve (2015) holds a similar view, saying, “The
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The problem with de Bary’s argument is that all of this can be true with Reid861
nevertheless being an internalist. As we have seen, even if Reid holds that some862
subjects are not aware of the principles of evidence, this does not entail that they863
do not have access to what makes their beliefs justified. Reid advocates that864
beliefs have a just ground in virtue of the reflective access we have to whether865
we are prejudiced, even though we do not need to make good on this access in866
every case. Instead, Reid can still be seen to be the access internalist that he is867
– justification does not require that someone has reflected on the evidence they868
have for their beliefs, but simply that they have the capability of doing so.869
870
Another place where Reid has been misinterpreted is in his listing of the First871
Principles of Contingent Truths. The first of these principles affirms “the ex-872
istence of everything of which I am conscious” [578]. If taken in isolation, this873
principle seems to be stating that there is a certain connection between our874
mental states and the external world. This is how Alston takes the Principles,875
arguing that “the fact that [Reid’s] epistemological first principles have to do876
exclusively with reliability strongly suggests that this is the sort of account he877
would give.”44 If Alston is right, then maybe what Reid is doing is affirming reli-878
abilist principles of our faculties like Van Cleve takes Reid to be doing.45 What879
Alston fails to recognize, however, is that the Principles are not just assertions880
about the correspondence between our perceptions and the external world but881
are themselves facts that are self-evident. When Reid lists the First Principles882
of Contingent Truths, he is not simply listing truths about our constitutions883
(even though he does take them to be truths). Rather, he is listing certain884
fundamental Principles that are self-evident and irresistible and thus can be be-885
lieved blamelessly and with a just ground. Because Alston does not locate the886
Principles of Contingent Truths within this broader internalist framework, he887
ultimately concludes that they are evidence in favor of Reid being an externalist.888
4.4 Between Externalism and Internalism?889
Even though there are several externalist interpretations that fail to take Reid’s890
full corpus into account, Rene van Woudenberg’s “Between Externalism and891
Internalism” attempts to do justice to both the externalist and the internal-892
ist elements in Reid. Van Woudenberg begins by identifying positive epistemic893
statuses in Reid, and even though most of these statuses are internalist, he ulti-894
Reid I am showcasing is therefore an epistemological externalist – someone who thinks there
are important knowledge-making factors that do their work regardless of whether they are
themselves known” (317). It is quite confusing what Van Cleve takes to be the distinction be-
tween internalism and externalism, for according to Van Cleve (2015), even Roderick Chisholm
was an externalist in some sense: “Chisholm is an externalist in the sense that matters here:
there are sources of justification or knowledge that deliver their good even if the subject does
not know the are reliable” (p. 341). I have clarified what I take to be internalism, namely
what everyone party to the disagreement would take to be internalism, in Section 1, and thus
if one can be both an access internalist and an externalist by Van Cleve’s lights, his distinction
does not trace the traditional boundary between internalism and externalism.
44See Alston (1985), p. 437.
45See Van Cleve (2008), p. 305.
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mately argues that at least some of these statuses are external conditions. This895
would make Reid a weak externalist about positive epistemic status, someone896
who thinks that at least one of the conditions required for positive epistemic897
status are external. If these external conditions are part of what makes a belief898
justified, then this would make Reid a weak externalist about justification as899
well.46900
901
What are the externalist conditions that van Woudenberg identifies? Van902
Woudenberg holds that there are three elements of Reid’s thought that at least903
come close to being external conditions: (1) That a belief is produced by a reli-904
able natural faculty,47 (2) that a belief is supported by evidence of the senses,48905
and (3) that a belief is supported by testimonial evidence.49 Of these three, van906
Woudenberg only regards (1) as being a thoroughgoing externalist condition.907
With (3), van Woudenberg thinks it is clear that, when a person remembers the908
testimony that supports their belief, (3) is an internal conditional. He then en-909
tertains the possibility that, when a person has forgotten the explicit testimony910
but still recalls that there is some objective support for the belief, (3) might be911
a partially external condition. Ultimately, however, he concludes that “in both912
cases the condition is internal,”50 leaving (1) and (2) as the only candidates for913
externalist conditions for positive epistemic status.914
915
When it comes to (2), a belief being supported by evidence of the senses, van916
Woudenberg thinks that this condition is mostly internal. Van Woudenberg917
also considers Bergmann’s argument, that the contingent connection between918
particular sensations and the beliefs they produce put Reid in the externalist919
camp. In response, van Woudenberg distinguishes between two different ques-920
tions, “(A) whether we can tell by reflection alone whether certain evidence of921
the senses is present; and (B) whether we can tell by reflection alone why it922
is that sensations of a certain kind signify certain qualities, and why it is that923
those sensations induce us to believe that the objects perceived posses those924
qualities,” arguing that only (A) is needed for Reid’s view of the evidence of925
the senses to qualify as internalist.51 Van Woudenberg then goes on to argue926
that, in most cases, Reid would answer (A) in the affirmative, making Reid an927
internalist about condition (2).928
929
The only point at which van Woudenberg thinks that (2) might be an external930
condition is when it comes to the difficulty of separating between perception and931
inference, a challenge we discussed in connection with blamelessness in Section 2.932
Van Woudenberg develops this argument by pointing out that we rarely separate933
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between the beliefs we form about the emotions of others and the expressions934
that we observe on their faces, arguing that “most often we are unaware of935
our visual sensations, even upon reflection.”52 In response to this suggestion,936
it will once again be helpful to reiterate that the difficulty of separating be-937
tween perception and inference does not necessarily undermine an internalist938
understanding of Reid. If it is impossible in principle to distinguish between939
the information of the senses and the further conclusions we reach using such940
evidence, then we cannot portray Reid as ascribing to Access Internalism,941
but this is not what we find in Reid. Instead, even though Reid acknowledges942
that “it is unnatural to the mind to stop at the visible figure, and attend to it”943
[146], he also does not regard it as impossible to do so, as “an excellent painter944
or statuary can tell, not only what are the proportions of a good face, but what945
changes every passion makes in it” [147]. Even though it may be challenging to946
separate between what we perceive and what we infer from what we perceive, it947
is not impossible to do so, preventing (2) from conclusively being an externalist948
condition of positive epistemic status.949
950
This leaves us with condition (1), that a belief is produced by a reliable natural951
faculty, as the crux of van Woudenberg’s argument. There is no disputing that952
this is an external condition. We cannot discern via introspection whether our953
beliefs are formed by reliable cognitive faculties, making achieving (1) an ex-954
ternal condition for positive epistemic status. The important question, then, is955
whether we can move from the premise that (1) is an external condition to the956
conclusion that Reid is an exernalist about epistemic justification. For reasons957
that I have already articulated, I think that the answer to this question is no.958
We already saw that having a sound understanding is an external condition, as a959
believer has no control over whether or not their brain develops normally. This,960
however, is not enough to make Reid an externalist about justification. Access961
internalists can agree that having normally developed cognitive hardware is a962
precondition for having justified beliefs without also thinking that justification963
itself is external. Thus, the fact that Reid takes it as a positive when our beliefs964
are formed by reliable cognitive faculties does not settle the debate over whether965
he is an externalist about justification.966
967
A further reason to think that we shouldn’t take (1) to describe Reid’s view of968
justification comes from the case that van Woudenberg makes for (1) being a969
condition for positive epistemic status.53 In his argument that (1) is an element970
of positive epistemic status, van Woudenberg appeals to Reid’s response to the971
global skeptic, that his trust in perception “came from the mint of Nature” [183].972
It is not clear, however, that we should regard being supplied by nature as a973
normative epistemic status of belief. In defending his answer to the skeptic, Reid974
appeals, not to epistemic normativity, but to practical normativity: “I think it975
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me, and impose upon me by false appearances, and I, by my great cunning977
and profound logic, have discovered the imposture, prudence would dictate to978
me, in this case, even to put up with this indignity done to me” [184]. Here,979
Reid defends his trust in perception by arguing that doing so is most prudent,980
appealing to practical reasons instead of epistemic reasons. If this is Reid’s981
approach to (1), though, then (1) would not be a fitting candidate for a view of982
epistemic justification.983
Conclusion984
Thomas Reid is often interpreted as an externalist about justification because985
of his emphasis on the faculties by which our beliefs are produced. Once his talk986
about the reliability of these faculties is seen in light of epistemic blamelessness987
and freedom from prejudice, however, it becomes clear that the most plausible988
take is that, if Reid has a view on justification at all, it is an access internalist989
account of the normative statuses of belief. Seen in their proper light, beliefs990
about the reliability of our faculties gain traction because they are blameless991
and have a just ground, making our beliefs about the reliability of our faculties992
a subset of the beliefs that are internally justified.993
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